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Richard: Constitutional Law - Enforcement of NCAA Sanctions by a Public In

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Enforcement of NCAA Sanctions by a
Public Institution-Is There State Action by the NCAA? National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
INTRODUCTION

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an unincorporated association of nearly 960 members consisting of virtually
all public and private universities and four-year colleges conducting
athletic programs in America.' By joining the NCAA each member institution agrees to abide by and to enforce the NCAA rules which are
determined by the members at annual conventions.' In the interim,
the NCAA is governed by its Council which appoints various committees such as the Committee on Infractions.' The Committee on Infractions is authorized to carry on investigations, make factual determinations regarding rule violations and to impose appropriate penalties
on member institutions found to be violating NCAA rules.4
In the early 1970s, the NCAA received several anonymous communications that violations of NCAA rules had occurred in the basketball program at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV).' In
1972, the NCAA advised the president of UNLV that it was beginning
an inquiry into UNLV's athletic programs.
After the inquiry began, UNLV initiated a separate investigation.'
As a result of its investigation, UNLV submitted a response to the
NCAA which contended that no violations of NCAA rules had occurred.8
Despite UNLV's findings, the NCAA issued a report detailing 38
violations of NCAA rules by UNLV, ten involving head basketball coach
Jerry Tarkanian.9 The NCAA placed UNLV's basketball team on probation for two years and ordered UNLV to show cause why the NCAA
should not impose further penalties against the university if it did not
sever all ties between its athletic program and Tarkanian during the
probation.1
Upon UNLV's request for reconsideration, the NCAA affirmed its
prior findings and penalties. 1 Subsequently, UNLV conducted a hearing
to determine whether to follow the NCAA directive. 12 Although the
1. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 8, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109
S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id.; see also Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331,
334, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987).
9. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456 (1988).
10. Id. See also Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. at 334,
741 P.2d at 1347.
11. Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 334, 741 P.2d at
1347.
12. Id.
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hearing officer questioned the factual basis of the NCAA charges against
Tarkanian, he determined that the university had no choice but to
the hearaccept the NCAA's penalties.13 UNLV's president accepted
14
ing officer's recommendation and suspended Tarkanian
Tarkanian filed suit against UNLV in a Nevada state court, alleging that he had been denied his fourteenth amendment due process
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983."5 Tarkanian sought a declaration that he had been denied procedural and substantive due process
of law.1 6 He claimed that he was deprived of his due process rights
because the meaningful factual determinations, as well as the decision
as to the penalty to be imposed, had been made by the NCAA before
he was afforded a hearing by UNLV.' 7 The state district court found
that Tarkanian's fourteenth amendment rights had been violated and
enjoined UNLV "and all persons in active concert . . ." with UNLV

from suspending him or taking any other action based on the NCAA
report."'
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
decision, holding that the NCAA was a necessary party.19 On remand,
after NCAA was added as a defendant, the district court concluded that
the actions of both the NCAA and UNLV constituted state action depriving Tarkanian of due process,"° and permanently enjoined UNLV from
suspending Tarkanian and the NCAA from taking further action
against UNLV. 2 ' On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the NCAA's action constituted state
action.22
The United States Supreme Court granted the NCAA's petition for
2" NationalCollegiateAthletic Association v. Tarkanian,was
certiorari.
a case of first impression because the Supreme Court had never ruled
on the NCAA's status as a state or private actor.24 The Court held that
the NCAA was not engaged in state action when it conducted its investigation and directed UNLV to suspend Tarkanian." Because the Court
13. Id. The UNLV Hearing Officer recommended that UNLV recognize the university's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as ultimate arbiter of these matters,
and reassign Tarkanian from his present position-though tenured and without adequate notice-even while believing that the NCAA was wrong. Brief for Respondent
at 17-18.
14. Brief for Respondent at 17-18.
15. Id. at 18. See also Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456.
16. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389,394, 594 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1979).

17. Id. 95 Nev. at 398, 594 P.2d at 1164.
18. Brief for Respondent at 18.

19. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian,95 Nev. at 399, 594 P.2d at 1163.
20. Brief for Respondent at 18-19.

21. Id. Although the NCAA appealed this ruling to the Nevada Supreme Court,
UNLV did not. Id. at 21.
22.
(1987).
23.
24.
25.

Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345
108 S. Ct. 1011 (1988).
Id.; see also 109 S. Ct. at 457 n.5
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457.
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characterized the NCAA as a private actor, the constitutional remedies under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are not available against the NCAA
for state employees who are suspended or terminated because of recommendations made by the NCAA. This casenote will analyze the Court's
treatment of the NCAA as a private actor, concluding that the NCAA
should be characterized as a state actor when it is acting in concert
with a state university.
BACKGROUND

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations, under color
of state law, of any of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured
by the Constitution.2 6 In order to bring a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege two elements.27 First, the plaintiff must allege that a
person has deprived him of a constitutionally protected right. Second,
the plaintiff must allege that the person who
has deprived him of that
28
right has acted under color of state law.
Private actors are not subject to fourteenth amendment constraints.
However, actions of the state clearly are subject to the fourteenth
amendment.2 9 The questions raised in state action cases arise because
it appears that the state is involved with private action to an extent
that the challenged action has become an action of the state. If the state
is participating in private action to a sufficient degree, then that action
and the private party may become subject to the constraints of the fourteenth amendment.
On numerous occasions the Court has attempted to define the degree
of participation by the state that is necessary to transform private action
into state action. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court held that judicial
enforcement by state courts of a racially restrictive covenant was state
action which denied petitioners equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment.2 0 Thus, the racially restrictive covenants were
not illegal as between private parties but judicial enforcement of the
covenants constituted state action and such enforcement was in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.2 Shelley made it clear that
participation by the state in a discriminatory activity violated the four26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation...
of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
See also Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtectionof Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 4 (1985).
27. Mahoney, The Prima Facie Section 1983 Case, in SECTION 1983 SWORD AND
SMELD 120 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed. 1983).
28. Id.; see also, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
29. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169-70 (1970).
30. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
31. See generally, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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teenth amendment. 3 The question then became: what constituted state
participation or state action?
The Court recognized that even slight participation by the state
would violate the fourteenth amendment.33 In Burton v. Wilmington
ParkingAuth., the Court found state action where a private segregated
cafeteria was operated in a state owned parking building.34 The Court
found state action because the building was owned by the state, the
upkeep and maintenance were responsibilities of the state, and the location of the building conferred a benefit on the operator of the cafeteria.
This degree of state participation
in a discriminatory activity violated
3 5
the fourteenth amendment.

The Court found that state action could be present when a private
action initiated a state action. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., Sandra
Adickes, a white school teacher brought suit under section 1983 for
violation of her constitutional rights under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.3 6 Adickes entered the Kress store with
six of her black students. A waitress took the orders of the students
but refused to serve Adickes because she was a white person "in the
company of Negroes. 37 After the refusal of service, the group left the
store. Once outside, Adickes was arrested for vagrancy by a police
officer. 9
The Court in Adickes considered whether there was sufficient state
action to prove a violation of petitioner's fourteenth amendment rights
if she showed that Kress refused her service because of a state enforced
custom compelling segregation of the races in restaurants." The Court
remanded the case and held, inter alia, that if Adickes proved that Kress
refused her service because of a state enforced custom of segregating
the races in public restaurants, then she would show an abridgement
of her equal protection rights.4 1 Following Adickes, the Court was faced
with situations that were closer to the line between state and private
action and the Court became more restrictive and ruled on the private
side of the line.
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis the Court held that the operation
of a state's liquor regulations upon a private club with racially discriminatory bylaws did not sufficiently involve the state in the club's
discriminatory policies as to make those practices state action.43 The
32.
33.
Adams,
34.

Id.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See also, Terry v.
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).

35. Id. at 724.

36. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
37. Id. at 146, 149.

38. Id. at 149.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 169.
41. Id. at 170-71.
42. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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Court found nothing in Moose Lodge to approach the symbiotic relationship between the lessor and lessee in Burton.4 3 Since Moose Lodge,
the Court has been reluctant to find state action present in private
activity on the basis that there is a state law which recognizes the
legitimacy of actions taken by a private person.44 But the Court will
find state action when the state and a private party are jointly engaged
in an action.
In Dennis v. Sparks, the Court held that private persons, jointly
engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting "under
color" of law for purposes of section 1983 actions.4" The Court explained
that to act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes does not
require that the defendant be an officer of the State; rather, "it is enough
that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its

agents.'

'46

In 1982 the Supreme Court, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., articulated a new test for what constitutes state action.47 In Lugar, the Court
stated that the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment
is identical to the statutory requirement in section 1983 of action taken
under color of state law.48
In Lugar the Court articulated a two-part test for deciding whether
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
right is fairly attributable to the state.4 9 First, the deprivation must
be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state
or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom
the state is responsible.5 ° Second, "the party charged with the depri'51
vation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.
A person may be considered a state actor because "he is a state official, because he acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
state. '52 The Court held that Lugar was deprived of his property through
state action and therefore Edmondonson Oil Co. was acting under color5
of state law in participating in the deprivation of Lugar's property.
43. Id. at 174.
44. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 435 (3d ed. 1986).
45. 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). The Dennis decision resulted from a § 1983 action,
brought against a state court judge and others who allegedly conspired to bribe the
judge to obtain an injunction. The defendants (petitioners) argued that the immunity
to § 1983 actions for judges should be extended to their actions. Id.
46. Id.
47. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, the petitioner, who operated a truck stop was
indebted to his supplier, Edmondson Oil Co., Edmondson Oil Co., through a prejudgment attachment procedure, which only required Edmondson to allege a belief that
petitioner might dispose of his property in order to defeat his creditors, was able to
obtain a writ of attachment. The writ of attachment was executed by the Sheriff who
sequestered petitioner's property. Petitioner brought suit under § 1983. Id.
48. Id. at 929.
49. Id. at 937.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 942.
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On the same day that the Court decided Lugar it decided two other
state action cases.54 Applying the Lugar test, the Court stated that the
ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under
section 1983 is whether the alleged infringement is "fairly attributable" to the state.5 5 Thus, the Lugar test is the Court's articulation of
how it will determine state action and what constitutes "under color
of state law" for purposes of section 1983.56
The NCAA As a State Actor
In the pre-Lugarperiod of Supreme Court state action decisions,
virtually every federal court considering whether NCAA conduct constituted state action found that it did.57 In fact, until October of 1984,
with only one exception, every federal court that considered whether
NCAA actions were "under color of state law" within the meaning of
section 1983 answered that question in the affirmative.5"
After Lugar, however, federal courts began to hold that NCAA
actions were not state actions.5" For example, the Fifth Circuit, in
McCormack v. National CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, held that the NCAA
was not a state agency and did not act under color of law within the
meaning of section 1983.60 In Arlosoroff v. NationalCollegiateAthletic
Ass'n, the Fourth Circuit held that the NCAA was a private entity and
did not find any state action." The Sixth Circuit in Karmanosv. Baker,
54. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982).
55. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838.
56. Lugar, 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
57. See Regents of Minnesota v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352,
(8th Cir. 1977); Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975)
(later overruled); Associated Students, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493
F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). In the pre-Lugarcontext, the NCAA was found to be a state
actor even in situations that involved private colleges or universities. See, e.g., Parish
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1975) (later overruled); Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
58. Martin, The NCAA and Its Student-Athletes. Is There Still State Action?, 20
NEW ENG. L. REV. 49, 56 (1985-1986). The exception was McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
59. See, e.g., McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Spath v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 728 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1984).
60. McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th
Cir. 1988). McCormack involved a suit against the NCAA for violation of civil rights
and antitrust laws for enforcing sanctions against Southern Methodist University. The
court in McCormack specifically distinguishes the Nevada Supreme Court's holding
in Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n because the Nevada Supreme Court
relied on the fact that UNLV was a state university and Tarkanian was a public
employee. Id. at 1346.
61. Arlosoroffv. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (4th
Cir. 1984). In Arlosoroffthe action was brought by a college tennis player against the
NCAA and Duke University. Id. at 1020. The issue ofjoint action with the NCAA and
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held that the plantiffs failed to demonstrate that the NCAA had acted
under color of state law.6 2 The Sixth Circuit, in Graham v. National
CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, had previously held that the NCAA's adoption of rules regulating eligibility of transfer students did not constitute state action.6
After Lugar,some circuits overruled their previous decisions. For
example, the Fifth Circuit in Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, held that NCAA action constituted state action. 4 In 1988, the
Fifth Circuit reversed Parish in McCormack.6 5 The Fifth Circuit
reversed Parishbecause Lugarhad more narrowly defined the concept
of state action.66 Since Lugar every court to consider the issue has held
that NCAA actions are not state actions or actions under color of state
law.6 7 This trend in the federal courts set the stage for the Supreme
Court to hear Tarkanian.The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in 1988.68
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Tarkanian,the United States Supreme Court held that UNLV's
suspension of Tarkanian in compliance with NCAA sanctions did not
turn the NCAA's otherwise private conduct into state action.6 9 Therefore, the NCAA was not liable for violation of Tarkanian's right to due
process. 71 In so holding, the Court reversed the Nevada State Supreme
Court's decision that the NCAA was a state actor.7
In reaching this result, the United States Supreme Court characterized UNLV as a branch of the University of Nevada which is a state
funded institution, and found that the executives of UNLV "unquestionably" acted under the color of state law when performing official
a publicuniversity was not addressed in Arlosoroff or McCormack, See Tarkanian,109
S. Ct. at 467 n.2. (White, J., dissenting).
62. Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1987). In Karmanos a hockey
player was declared ineligible by the eligibility committee of the NCAA but Karmanos
failed to allege that a state university caused or directed implementation of the rules
at issue. Id. at 259.
63. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986).
Graham involved the University of Louisville and players who attempted to transfer
from their football program to the football program at Western Kentucky University,
Id. at 955, 958.
64. Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir.
1975).
65. McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F,2d 1338, 1346 (5th
Cir. 1988).
66. Id, at 1345, n.38.
67. Id.; see also Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 957-58
(6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroffv. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 22
(4th Cir. 1984); Hawkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Aas'n, 652 F,Supp. 602, 606-09
(C.D. Ill. 1987); Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F Supp. 1047,
1054-55 (W.D. Tex. 1986); McHale v, Cornell Univ,, 620 F, Supp. 67, 69-70 (N.D.N.Y,
1985).
68. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 108 S, Ct. 1011 (1988).
69. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S, Ct. 454 (1988).
70. Id. at 465-66.
71. Id. at 466.
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functions.7 2 The Court, however, described the NCAA as an unincorporated association of nearly 960 members consisting of virtually all
public and private universities conducting major athletic programs in
America.7 3 The Court conceded that a state university is without question a state actor.74 Therefore, the issue was whether UNLV's actions,
taken in compliance with the NCAA rules75 and recommendations, turned
the NCAA's conduct into state action.
In the majority's view, UNLV was able to participate in promulgating the NCAA's rules by virtue of its membership.76 Therefore, the
Court stated that UNLV had the option of changing the NCAA's policies from within the NCAA organization. However, since the NCAA
adopts its rules through member-initiated legislation, the rules are a
product of the NCAA and not individual member institutions.7 7 Because
UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA, or to work
through the NCAA's legislative process to attempt to change rules that
it considered unfair, the Court held that the NCAA's conduct did not
constitute state action. 8
Since UNLV made efforts to retain its winning coach, a goal which
was in conflict with the NCAA's investigation, and because UNLV and
the NCAA acted like adversaries during the investigation, the Court
7
stated that the NCAA could not be regarded as an agent for UNLV.
The Court analogized their adversarial positions to the facts in Polk
County v. Dodson.80 In Polk County, a state compensated public defender
was held to be a private actor because she represented a private client
in a conflict against the state.8 1 Thus, following Polk County, the Court
viewed the NCAA as a private actor at odds with the state when the
NCAA represents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of one public university.8 2
Moreover, the Court found that the NCAA did not have governmental powers to facilitate its investigation," and that the NCAA could
not directly impose sanctions on any state employee.84 Because of these
factors, the Court held that the NCAA's conduct did not constitute state
action. 5
72. Id. at 457.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 462. Note that the Court applies the test enunciated in Lugar in this

case. Id. at 463, 465.

75. Id. at 462.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 463; see also, id. at 465 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974), where the Court held that a state's conferral of monopoly status does not convert a private party into a state actor).
79. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464.
80. 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981).
81. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 (citing Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320).

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. n.16.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 466.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss1/17

8

Richard: Constitutional Law - Enforcement of NCAA Sanctions by a Public In

1990

CASENOTES

289

Justice White, in dissent, argued that the issue was whether the
NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian and thereby
also became a state actor.86 He recognized that Tarkanianwas factually different from many of the Court's prior decisions in which the
presence or absence of state action was an issue. 7 In those cases, a private party had taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff and the question was whether the private party acted under the
color of state law."8 Tarkanian differed because the final act which
caused harm to Tarkanian was committed by a party conceded to be
a state actor, and the question was whether the actions by a private
party which laid the groundwork for the state actor also constituted
state action.89
Justice White relied on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 90 and Dennis
v. Sparks.9 1 In both Adickes and Dennis, the Court held that private
parties could be found to be state actors if they were jointly engaged
with state officials in the challenged action." Justice White concluded
that under these facts, the NCAA had acted jointly with UNLV and
therefore was a state actor. 93
ANALYSIS

The NCAA was jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged
action in Tarkanian.In fact, as a member of the NCAA, UNLV had
contractuallyagreed to enforce NCAA policies and regulations.9 4 UNLV
agreed that it would accept the NCAA's findings of fact as superior
to its own and that those findings of fact would be binding.9 5 UNLV
conducted its own investigation into the allegations against Tarkanian
and found no violations of NCAA rules. Despite this contrary conclusion, UNLV had to accept the NCAA findings. Because UNLV was not
free to accept findings from its own investigation, the NCAA and UNLV
were joint actors and not separate actors.
UNLV's agreement to accept the NCAA's findings resulted in
UNLV imposing NCAA sanctions on Tarkanian which effectively
deprived him of his fourteenth amendment rights without due process
of law. By its delegating power to determine disciplinary conditions
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
91. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
92. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466.
93. Id. at 468.
94. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 391, 594 P.2d at 1160 (emphasis
added). See also, Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560
F.2d 352, 360 (8th Cir. 1977) (NCAA does not allow any individual institution to retain
interpretative or enforcement authority over NCAA legislation).
95. Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 467.
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and sanctions for state employees,96 the state, via UNLV, directly
involved itself in the NCAA's deprivation of Tarkanian's fourteenth
amendment rights.
The majority relied on the argument that because the NCAA did
not have any power to take action directly against Tarkanian, the
NCAA was not a state actor.9 7 The problem with this finding is that
it is inconsistent with, and rejected by, Dennis.9" In Dennis, the private parties did not have any power to take action against the plaintiff; only the state actor, with his authority, could act against the plaintiff.99 The same was true in Tarkanian;the NCAA could take no action
against Tarkanian without the participation of the state actor, UNLV.
The majority's position that the NCAA was not a state actor because
the NCAA did not have any power to take action directly against Tarkanian, was also rejected in Adickes. "I In Adickes, the Court held that
private parties could be state actors if they were jointly engaged with
state officials in a challenged action. 10 1 The NCAA was jointly engaged
with state officials at UNLV in the suspension of Tarkanian. Here, as
in Adickes, a private party initiated an action that was enforced by
state officials in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Under the Lugar test, a party may be considered a state actor if
it has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because its conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state.0 2
Applying the Lugar test to the facts in Tarkanian,it is indisputable
that the NCAA acted together with UNLV and obtained significant
aid from state officials, via UNLV, in suspending Tarkanian.
However, the majority relied extensively on the argument that the
NCAA and UNLV were adversaries throughout the proceedings and
therefore there was no joint participation between them. 0 The dissent
pointed out that the key in this relationship, "as with any conspiracy,
is that ultimately the parties agreed to take the action."'0 4 Although
UNLV disputed the NCAA's findings, in the final analysis UNLV
agreed to act with the NCAA and therefore UNLV and the NCAA were
not adversaries.
96, The majority argues that there is no delegation of power by UNLV to the
NCAA. However, the agreement between UNLV and the NCAA requires UNLV to
accept the NCAA's findings of fact as superior and requires UNLV to cooperate fully
with an NCAA investigation. More broadly, UNLV has delegated its ability to fashion
rules and regulations, make factual findings and to determine sanctions and penalties. This is a substantial delegation.
97, Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
Id. at 169; see also, Tarkanian 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
Lugan 457 U.S, at 937.

103. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).

104. Id,at 468.
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Because UNLV was free to withdraw from the NCAA, the majority
found no state action. 0 5 The state actor in Dennis had the option to
withdraw from the agreement as well, but the relevant consideration
is not that the state actor could have withdrawn, but that it did not.01°
The state actor in both cases chose to abide by the agreement and use
its power as a state actor to enforce penalties without the due process
of law required by the fourteenth amendment.
The theoretical option to withdraw from the NCAA is not a realistic one. UNLV is completely dependent upon the NCAA for its ability
to engage in intercollegiate athletics. 107 For an institution that wants
prestige in intercollegiate athletics or a share of the NCAA's television revenue, membership is far from voluntary. 08 Participating NCAA
members in the NCAA television program received in excess of thirteen million dollars in television rights for both 1972 and 1973.'0 9 Television appearances provide not only network money but alumni contributions, exposure to scouts for athletes aspiring to a professional
career, and easier recruiting for future teams."0 For a college or university, membership in the NCAA is an economic necessity.'1 ' Yet, the
only choice the Tarkaniandecision leaves state universities is either
to follow NCAA policies, rules and sanctions - at the expense of the
employee's rights - or not to have an intercollegiate athletic program.
In Burton, the Court found state action because a private entity
received state benefits." 2 In Burton, a private actor was using a state
owned building and the state and private actor were in such a position of
interdependence that the action was not purely private."' The NCAA
has a similar position of interdependence with state university members
such as UNLV. Public institutions, which compose approximately onehalf of the NCAA's membership, pay state funds to the NCAA."1 4 States
115
also provide the facilities in which NCAA athletic contests take place.
105. Id. The majority argued that UNLV could participate inside the NCAA process
to change NCAA policies and rules. Id. However, if that is true, then the regulations
promulgated by the NCAA can be fairly attributed to UNLV because it has participated in promulgating those regulations.
106. Id. at 467.
107. Brief for Respondent at 24.
108. Martin, The NCAA and the FourteenthAmendment, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383,
392 (1976).
109. Id. at 391.
110. Id. at 391-92. For further reading see Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the
Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101 (1984).
111. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 398, 594 P.2d at 1165 (1979). See
also, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85 (1984), where the Court held that the anti-trust laws did apply to some aspects of
college football competition and that the NCAA had violated those laws by restricting
the ability of member schools to seek the rights to televise the schools' football games.
McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).
112. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
113. Id.
114. Martin, supra note 108, at 395.
115. Id.; see also Kelly v. Board of Education, 293 F. Supp. 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn.),
where that court emphasized the utilization of state facilities as a determining factor
in finding state action.
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Arguably, UNLV could have provided a more meaningful hearing
for Tarkanian prior to suspending him. The problem with that is twofold.
First, the NCAA regulations are such that the university must accept
the NCAA's fact findings as superior to its own. Therefore, UNLV was
prevented by its agreement with the NCAA from making a decision
based upon its own investigation and findings of fact. Second, the sanctions that the NCAA was threatening to impose were such that the
hearing officer felt that there was no other option available to UNLV
other than to comply with the NCAA and suspend Tarkanian. The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time.'1 6 The binding factual determinations, as well
as the decision as the to penalty to be imposed, had been made by the
NCAA before Tarkanian was afforded a hearing." 7 Any hearing that
UNLV provided to Tarkanian would not have given him an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time because the facts and the penalty
had already been determined.
The majority relied on what is seemingly a clear dividing line in
the federal court decisions."' At first glance, it appears that federal
courts held that the NCAA was a state actor for section 1983 purposes
and then, after the Court's decision in Lugar, the federal courts held
to the contrary."' Upon closer examination, however, the line drawn
is not as clear as the majority suggests. In fact, none of the cases
addressed the theory before the Court in Tarkanian.2 °
For example, Arlosoroff involved an action that was brought against
the NCAA and Duke University, a private institution. In McCormack,
the action involved Southern Methodist University, which is also a private university. The issue ofjoint action between the NCAA and a public
university would never have arisen in either of those cases. In addition, Karmanos and Graham principally rely on Arlosoroff which
challenged the actions of a private university.' 2 ' In none of these cases
did the courts address the theory before the Court in Tarkanian,that
the NCAA, acting in concert with a state university, was a "state
actor."' 22
Another very important difference between these cases and Tarkanianis that none of them involved a tenured state employee; rather,
they all involved students. Tarkanian was a tenured state employee
who had a substantial property interest in his position. When a state
university decides to impose serious disciplinary sanctions on a tenured
employee it must comply with the terms of the due process clause of
116. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 398, 594 P.2d at 1164.
117. Id. When a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and opportunity to be heard
are essential. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972).
118. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457 n.5.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 467 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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the fourteenth amendment." 3 Thus, the situation presented in Tarkanian was unique. State institutions owe their employees the protections of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.' An employee's
property and liberty interest varies significantly from a student athlete's interests.
The Court's holding effectively enables the NCAA to force a state
institution to violate a constitutional obligation that it has toward its
tenured employees. In the present case the NCAA mandated UNLV
to enforce its sanctions in a fashion which violated due process and after
doing so, UNLV ended up in court, while the NCAA's only response
was that they weren't involved. 12 5 The Tarkaniandecision leaves state
institutions in a serious dilemma: either they violate the constitution
by enforcing NCAA sanctions2 6 , or they withdraw from the NCAA.
The second is not a viable option for institutions involved in intercollegiate athletics.
CONCLUSION

Given the prestige, the revenue and the exposure that member institutions receive from affiliation with the NCAA, membership is far from
voluntary. The NCAA ultimately decides whether to discipline state
employees involved with intercollegiate athletics. The United States
Supreme Court should have ruled that the NCAA was a state actor
in its relationship with UNLV, thus protecting due process rights normally afforded to state employees. However, with the majority's holding in Tarkanian,the NCAA, without risk of liability is able to put
state institutions in a position where they are essentially forced to violate their employee's due process rights. With the Court's characterization of the NCAA as private actor, Tarkanian and other state
employees do not have a remedy against the NCAA for violating their
procedural due process rights.
ANDREA LEAH RICHARD

123. Tarkanian,109 S. Ct. at 462. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
124. Tarkanian,109 S. Ct. at 462. Section 1983 actions have secured due process
rights of public employees. Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtectionofIndividual
Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 4, 20-21 (1985).
125. Brief for Respondents at 19. The NCAA argued that there was no actual controversy. Id.
126. Hypothetically, the NCAA could issue a Confidential Report or order that
required a state institution to fire a coach, because the coach is black, or face further

sanctions. This graphically points to the dilemma of a state school. A state employee
in that situation would have an action against the state university but, under the Court's
holding would not have an action against the NCAA.
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